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 Introduction 
 There is a striking difference between scientists and scientifically-minded 
philosophers: Scientists have not been afraid of engaging with Witt-
genstein. In cognitive psychology, for example, his ideas about family-
resemblance concepts inspired theoretical and experimental work on 
prototypes in categorisation. 1 In computational linguistics, his idea that 
questions about words’ meaning can be addressed by examining their use 
inspired the research programme of distributional semantics, 2 with semi-
nal contributions by the group of his student Margaret Masterman. 3 In 
contrast, Wittgenstein’s apparently anti-naturalistic views on philosophi-
cal method have generally prevented meaningful engagement with Witt-
gensteinian ideas by philosophers who wish to deploy scientific methods 
or findings. Conversely, many Wittgensteinian philosophers equated such 
methodological naturalism with ‘scientism’ and largely ignored develop-
ments in the cognitive or other sciences. 
 This chapter will argue that the advent of experimental philosophy, the 
most ‘hands-on’ form of methodological naturalism to date, facilitates a 
fresh, mutually beneficial, dialogue between Wittgensteinian philosophers 
and methodological naturalists: 4 I will argue that a prominent strand of 
experimental philosophy promotes a new kind of methodological natu-
 1 See, for example, Eleanor Rosch, “Principles of Categorisation,” in  Cognition and Cat-
egorization , eds. E. Rosch and B. Lloyd (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1978), 27–48, and J.A. 
Hampton, “Testing the Prototype Theory of Concepts,”  Journal of Memory and Lan-
guage 34 (1995): 686–708. 
 2 See K. Erk, “Vector Space Models of Word Meaning and Phrase Meaning: A Survey,” 
 Language and Linguistics Compass 6 (2012): 635–653 and P.D. Turney and P. Pantel, 
“From Frequency to Meaning: Vector Space Models of Semantics,”  Journal of Artificial 
Intelligence Research 37 (2010): 141–188. 
3 See K. Spärck-Jones,  Synonymy and Semantic Classification (PhD. diss., University of 
Cambridge. Cambridge Language Research Unit, 1964). 
 4 This methodological stance is independent from naturalism as a metaphysical posi-
tion. See J. Collins, “Naturalism Without Metaphysics,” in  Experimental Philosophy, 
Rationalism, and Naturalism , eds. E. Fischer and J. Collins (London: Routledge, 2015), 
85–109. This paper is exclusively concerned with the methodological stance. 
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ralism, ‘meta-philosophical naturalism’, which is consistent with broadly 
Wittgensteinian aims and strictures (Section 1). This new naturalism 
facilitates research that can provide empirical foundations precisely for 
the ‘therapeutic’ aspects of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy that 
 prima facie seem most antithetical to methodological naturalism (Section 
2). Recent psycholinguistic research is a case in point: It can vindicate Witt-
gensteinian ideas about how an ‘urge to misunderstand’ engenders merely 
apparent problems—like the classic ‘problem of perception’ 5 —which call 
for a therapeutic approach (Section 3). Using cognitive therapy 6 as a model, 
we will see that these insights into the cognitive sources of the problem 
already provide the best part of what is needed for therapy (Section 4). 
 This argument will not address exegetical concerns. (There is no ques-
tion of attributing to Wittgenstein concepts developed only decades after 
his death, and little point in speculating how his views would have evolved 
in response to them.) Rather, this programmatic paper seeks to bring into 
view fresh avenues for philosophical research: Research in experimental 
philosophy can provide new, empirical, foundations for some key aspects 
of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy (while remaining orthogonal 
to some others). Conversely, taking into account Wittgensteinian ideas 
about the nature and genesis of some philosophical problems can open 
up fresh applications for the tools of experimental philosophy—in a 
natural extension of one of its prominent strands. 
 1. A New Naturalism 
 1.1 Metaphilosophical Naturalism 
 Experimental philosophy imports empirical methods and findings from 
psychology into philosophy. Different projects in experimental philoso-
phy deploy the new means towards different ends. The  ‘Warrant Project’ 
responds to the practice, common in mainstream analytic philosophy, 
to use intuitions about hypothetical cases, considered in thought experi-
ments, as evidence for or against philosophical theories. 7 It is interested 
in the  evidentiary value of specific intuitions: in whether the mere fact 
 5 See Tim Crane, “The Problem of Perception,” in  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy , ed. N. Zalta, Summer 2015. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/. 
See also A.D. Smith,  The Problem of Perception (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2002). 
 6 See J.S. Beck,  Cognitive Therapy: Basics and Beyond , 2nd ed. (New York: Guilford, 
2011) and A.T. Beck, N.A. Rector, N. Stolar, and P. Grant,  Schizophrenia: Cognitive 
Theory, Research, and Therapy (New York: Guildford, 2008). 
 7 See Y. Cath, “Reflective Equilibrium,” in  Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodol-
ogy , eds. H. Cappelen, T. Szabo Gendler, and J. Hawthorne (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), 213–230, J. Nagel, “Intuitions and Experiments: A Defence of the Case 
Method in Epistemology,”  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2012): 495–
527, and J.M. Weinberg, “Intuitions,” in  Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodol-
ogy , 287–308. 
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that thinkers have them, as and when they do, speaks for their truth. 8 It 
seeks to develop a naturalised epistemology of intuitions which deter-
mines intuitions’ evidentiary value on an empirical basis. 
 The Warrant Project’s most ambitious strand, variously characterised 
as  ‘cognitive epistemology’ , 9 the ‘Sources Project’, 10 or the ‘underwater 
part’ of ‘iceberg epistemology’, 11 seeks to develop and experimentally 
test explanations of intuitive judgments which trace their source to auto-
matic cognitive processes that go on below the waterline of conscious 
awareness. This research seeks an understanding of these underlying 
processes that allows us to determine under what conditions we may 
(not) trust the intuitions they generate. 12 One approach seeks to trace 
intuitions back to processes that are generally reliable but predictably 
lead to cognitive illusions, 13 under specific circumstances. 14 Such expla-
nations can vindicate intuitions generated under normal circumstances 15 
and debunk intuitions formed under specific circumstances identified as 
vitiating. 16 
 Experimental philosophy is often regarded as the epitome of method-
ological naturalism. But at any rate, the Sources Project promotes a new 
form of naturalism. Traditional or  first-order methodological naturalism 
seeks to address philosophical problems about a topic X (say, the mind or 
perception) by building on scientific findings about X. The present proj-
ects, by contrast, wish to contribute to the resolution of philosophical 
 8 See J. Alexander,  Experimental Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity 2012), R. Mallon, 
“Experimental Philosophy,” in  Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology , 
410–433, and S. Stich and K. Tobia, “Experimental Philosophy and the Philosophical 
Tradition,” in  Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy , eds. J. Sytsma and W. 
Buckwalter (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2016), 5–21. 
  9 E. Fischer, “Philosophical Intuitions, Heuristics, and Metaphors,”  Synthese 191 (2014): 
569–606. 
 10 J. Pust, “Intuition,” in  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . 
 11 D.K. Henderson and T. Horgan,  The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of 
Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
 12 J.M. Weinberg, “Humans as Instruments: Or, the Inevitability of Experimental Philoso-
phy,” in  Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism , eds. E. Fischer and J. 
Collins (London: Routledge, 2015), 171–187. 
 13 R. Pohl, ed.,  Cognitive Illusions (New York: Psychology Press, 2004). 
 14 E.g., one line of research traces intuitive knowledge-attributions to a ‘mind-reading’ 
competency, which is argued to be generally reliable (K. Boyd and J. Nagel, “The Reli-
ability of Epistemic Intuitions,” in  Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy , 
eds. E. Machery and E. O’Neill (London: Routledge, 2014), 109–127) but subject 
to biases, including an egocentrism (J. Alexander, C. Gonnerman, and J. Waterman, 
“Salience, and Epistemic Egocentrism,” in  Advances in Experimental Epistemology , ed. 
J. Beebe (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 97–118) and focal bias (M. Gerken and J. Beebe, 
“Knowledge in and Out of Contrast,”  Nous 50 (2016): 133–164). 
 15 E.g., Nagel, “Intuitions and Experiments”. 
 16 E.g., E. Fischer and P.E. Engelhardt, “Intuitions’ Linguistic Sources: Stereotypes, Intu-
itions, and Illusions,”  Mind & Language 31 (2016): 65–101. 
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problems or debates about X by turning to scientific—psychological—
findings about  the way people think about X , in general or when 
doing philosophy. Fischer and Collins called this  ‘meta-philosophical 
naturalism’ . 17 This new ‘higher-order’ naturalism is distinct from, and 
implies no commitment to, first-order methodological naturalism. 
 This independence is illustrated by recent work on the ‘problem of 
perception’. This problem arises from paradoxical arguments that build 
on intuitions about cases of illusion and hallucination. 18 Their propo-
nents tend to consider  verbal descriptions of  hypothetical cases, rather 
than any actual cases; indeed, they stress they merely assume that the 
sort of hallucinations they are describing are  possible . Recent contribu-
tions to cognitive epistemology 19 explore the hypothesis that their intu-
itions about what else is true in the cases described are due to the routine 
language comprehension process of stereotypical enrichment, which has 
us automatically extract a maximum of information from verbal and 
written utterances. 20 This body of research develops and experimentally 
tests psycholinguistic explanations of these intuitions, with a view to 
assessing whether philosophers have warrant to accept their intuitions 
in the absence of further argument. To help assess philosophical claims 
about sense-perception, this research thus draws on, and generates, 
empirical findings about how people talk, think, and reason about sense-
perception. Where first-order naturalism would have philosophers turn 
to the psychology or neuroscience of perception, this work turns to the 
psychologies of language and judgment. This contribution to the War-
rant Project exemplifies meta-philosophical naturalism but violates the 
strictures of first-order methodological naturalism, demonstrating their 
independence. 
 1.2 A Wittgensteinian Perspective 
 As we shall see, this new naturalism—unlike its first-order cousin—is open 
to the pursuit of broadly Wittgensteinian aims, within broadly Wittgenstei-
nian strictures. Much work in the Warrant Project is directed at discrediting 
 17 E. Fischer and J. Collins, “Rationalism and Naturalism in the Age of Experimental 
Philosophy,” in  Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism and Naturalism , eds. E. Fischer 
and J. Collins (London: Routledge, 2015), 3–33. 
 18 See T. Crane, “The Problem of Perception,” in  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy ; H. Robinson,  Perception (London: Routledge, 2001); A.D. Smith,  The Problem of 
Perception (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
 19 E. Fischer, “Intuitions, Heuristics, Metaphors”; Fischer and Collins, “Rationalism and 
Naturalism”; E. Fischer and P.E. Engelhardt, “Stereotypical Inferences: Philosophical 
Relevance and Psycholinguistic Toolkit,”  Ratio (2017). doi 10.1111/rati.12174. 
 20 S.C. Levinson,  Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational 
Implicature (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). 
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intuition-driven philosophical theorizing. 21 This critical impetus is consis-
tent with different metaphilosophical outlooks: It is consistent with the 
view that philosophers should construct theories that rely not on intuitions, 
but on scientific evidence, to support their claims and solve their problems 
(first-order naturalism). But it is also consistent with the more Wittgenstei-
nian view that—some—philosophical problems should not be addressed by 
constructing philosophical theories but by ‘diagnostic’ approaches that ‘dis-
solve’ them, on the basis of (e.g., psycholinguistic) insights into ‘the work-
ings of language’ or other processes that shape philosophical thought. 
 Let’s develop the commonly neglected second possibility from a cur-
rently prominent perspective. Ongoing metaphilosophical debates con-
cern the role of intuitions in philosophy. 22 What role intuitions actually 
play in philosophical work is an empirical question. We can address it 
through case-studies on philosophical texts: by identifying expressions of 
intuitive judgments in these texts, and examining the dialectical, heuristic, 
argumentative, and justificatory roles intuitions play in them. 23 To what 
extent philosophical authors attribute evidentiary value to intuitions 
and adduce them as evidence for theories is a focus of ongoing debate. 24 
However, a series of case-studies on early modern and 20th-century ana-
lytic texts 25 revealed that intuitive judgments also play a role at a prior 
and perhaps more fundamental stage of philosophical thought, namely, 
in generating distinctive, and distinctively philosophical, problems. 
 A good example is the aforementioned ‘problem of perception’ 26 : “How 
is it possible that we perceive physical objects around us, when we use our 
five senses?” As standardly conceived (ibid.), this question is motivated by 
at least two related paradoxes, known as ‘arguments from illusion’ and 
‘from hallucination’. Both swiftly lead from brief descriptions of cases of 
illusion or hallucination,  via intuitions about what else is also true of these 
cases, 27 to the conclusion [q] that when we use our senses, we are aware 
 21 See Alexander,  Experimental Philosophy , 70–88; cf. J.M. Weinberg, “How to Challenge 
Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Scepticism,”  Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 
(2007): 318–343. 
 22 See H. Cappelen,  Philosophy Without Intuitions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012); Fischer and Collins, “Rationalism and Naturalism,”; J.M. Weinberg, “Intu-
itions,” in  Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology , eds. H. Cappelen, T. 
Szabo Gendler, and J. Hawthorne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 287–308. 
 23 See Cappelen,  Philosophy Without Intuitions and E. Fischer,  Philosophical Delusion 
and Its Therapy (New York: Routledge, 2011). 
 24 See Cappelen,  Philosophy , M. Deutsch,  The Myth of the Intuitive (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2015), and J.M. Weinberg, “Humans as Instruments: Or, the Inevitability of 
Experimental Philosophy” in  Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism , 
eds. E. Fischer and J. Collins (London: Routledge, 2015), 171–187. 
 25 See Fischer,  Philosophical Delusion . 
 26 See Crane, “The Problem of Perception,”; A.D. Smith,  The Problem of Perception 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
 27 See Robinson,  Perception , 54. 
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only of subjective perceptions or sense-data. The apparent clash with the 
common-sense conviction that [p] we see the tables and chairs around 
us, then provides a distinctive pre-scientific motivation for the question 
of how this is possible, namely, in view of the apparent conflict 28 : “How 
is it possible that p,  given that q ?” This apparent conflict may engender 
a sense of intellectual disquiet, make the very possibility of the otherwise 
humdrum fact (that p) seem puzzling and engender the kind of sense of 
wonder in the light of familiar facts or phenomena that Plato regarded as 
the starting-point of philosophising ( Theaetetus 155b-d). 29 
 Classical  theoretical responses (indirect realism, phenomenalism, etc.) 
seek to solve the problem and answer the question, mainly by showing 
that the parties to the apparent conflict are compatible, when properly 
understood. Such theories typically seek to honor the underlying intu-
itions and reconcile them with the background beliefs with which they 
appear to clash.  Diagnostic responses , by contrast, seek to reconstruct 
the underlying reasoning that motivates the question and expose defects 
in that reasoning, with a view to showing the question ill-motivated or 
meaningless (e.g., Austin). 30 Where successful, such responses can be said 
to ‘dissolve’ the initial problem by showing its proponents that they have 
no right to believe there is any such difficulty [q] as they took to stand 
in the way of the familiar fact [p]: that they imagined a difficulty where 
they have no warrant to believe there is one [q is unwarranted]. In such a 
case, their question (‘How is it possible that p,  given that q ?’) may well be 
intelligible. But it will be ill-motivated and articulate a ‘pseudo-problem’ 
engendered by an imaginary difficulty. 31 
 28 See Fischer,  Philosophical Delusion , 206–11; cf. Paul Horwich,  Wittgenstein’s Metaphi-
losophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
 29 The paradoxes underlying such problems can have roots, identified by Wittgenstein, 
ranging from adherence to unrealistic ideals of precision and rigour in natural language 
(PI §§ 98–103) to systematic reliance on “false analogies accepted into language” (BT 
409, cp. BT 408, 427, PI §§ 90, 94, 11, 112, 115). In the light of recent metaphor 
research in psychology and artificial intelligence, the latter may be conceived as system-
atic but task-specific  over reliance on linguistically realised conceptual metaphors (see 
Fischer, “Intuitions, Heuristics, Metaphors” and (in press) “Two Analogy-strategies: 
The Cases of Mind Metaphors and Introspection.”  Connection Science .) For a helpful 
general, if idealised, model of how distinctively philosophical problems arise through 
paradox, see Horwich,  Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy , 50–60, cp. 25–9. See fn. 33 and 
36 for Wittgenstein references. 
 30 J.L. Austin,  Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). 
 31 More traditional diagnostic approaches (e.g., ‘therapeutic diagnosis’, as defined, for 
example, by Michael Williams) seek to show the targeted questions meaningless, rather 
than ill-motivated, but convinced few philosophers without prior commitment to them. 
See Michael Williams, U nnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of 
Scepticism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), xvi. For the develop-
ment of the present notion of epistemic (rather than semantic) problem-dissolution, see 
Eugen Fischer, “Wittgenstein’s Non-cognitivism—Explained and Vindicated,”  Synthese 
162 (2008): 53–84 and his  Philosophical Delusion . Severin Schroeder magisterially 
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 Where familiar first-order naturalism has philosophers draw on scien-
tific findings to support a theoretical response to problems that may be 
imaginary, the metaphilosophical naturalism associated with experimen-
tal philosophy’s Sources Project remains open to either kind of response: 
Whether theoretical or diagnostic approaches are appropriate depends, for 
any particular problem of this form, on whether the motivating reasoning 
actually is sound or defective. Typically, this reasoning is largely intuitive 
and proceeds from, or crucially involves, intuitive judgments. Where this is 
the case, experimental philosophy’s Sources Project can determine which 
response is appropriate. Its ‘restrictionist’ proponents have sought debunk-
ing explanations of intuitions. 32 If successful, such explanations of intuitions 
which underlie philosophical problems provide empirical foundations for 
diagnostic approaches and vindicate their broadly Wittgensteinian aim of 
‘dissolving’ particular philosophical problems without residue. 33 
 At least where they expose misjudgments or fallacies, competent think-
ers would not be expected to commit, diagnostic analyses need empirical 
foundations: On their own, logical reconstructions of arguments cannot 
establish that glaring misjudgments or fallacies have been made: Herme-
neutic principles of charity impose constraints on attributions of ‘irra-
tionality’ and make it difficult to attribute such cognitive misdeeds to 
competent thinkers. 34 Medium-strength principles of charity demand that 
we justify such attributions by providing empirically supported explana-
tions of why competent thinkers make the mistakes attributed to them. 35 
 Such an empirically grounded diagnostic approach keeps in line with 
Wittgenstein’s provocative suggestion that “taking care of a philosophi-
cal problem is not a matter of pronouncing new truths about the sub-
ject of the investigation” (BT 416). Debunking explanations of relevant 
intuitions will establish new truths about the underlying cognitive pro-
cesses and the way people think about the subject of the philosophical 
investigation (e.g., sense-perception). But, unlike theoretical responses 
develops Wittgensteinian ideas about genesis and treatment of ‘pseudo-problems’. See 
Severin Schroeder,  Wittgenstein: The Way Out of the Fly-bottle (Malden, MA: Polity, 
2006), 151–168. 
 32 See Weinberg, “Challenge”. Cf. J. Knobe, and S. Nichols, “An Experimental Philosophy 
Manifesto,” in  Experimental Philosophy , eds. J. Knobe and S. Nichols (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 3–14. 
 33 Ludwig Wittgenstein,  The Big Typescript TS 213 , eds. and trans. by C.G. Luckardt 
and M.A.E. Aue (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 421. For brevity’s sake, we here focus on 
intuitions. The Sources Project also targets—e.g., religious or moral—beliefs (Knobe & 
Nichols “Manifesto”) whose debunking explanation helps dissolve problems motivated 
by reasoning presupposing them. 
 34 See J.E. Adler, “Fallacies and Alternative Interpretations,”  Australasian Journal of Phi-
losophy 72 (1994): 271–282 and M. Lewinski, “The Paradox of Charity,”  Informal 
Logic 32 (2012): 403–439. 
 35 See P. Thagard and R.E. Nisbett, “Rationality and Charity,”  Philosophy of Science 50 
(1983): 250–267. 
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to philosophical problems, they will not even purport to establish new 
truths about  that subject. 
 Accordingly, an empirically grounded diagnostic approach is also con-
sistent with Wittgenstein’s striking repudiation of  philosophical theorizing: 
 We may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything 
hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all expla-
nation, and description alone must take its place. And this descrip-
tion gets . . . its purpose from the philosophical problems. These are, 
of course, not empirical problems; they are to be solved by looking 
into the workings of our language . . . 36 
 Of course, cognitive epistemology (the Sources Project) seeks to explain 
why thinkers have certain intuitions (e.g., about certain linguistically 
described cases), and these explanations are informed by psychological 
theories (e.g., about language comprehension) and rely on hypotheses 
which are experimentally testable. But these explanations, theories, and 
hypotheses are psychological, not philosophical. They are used to empiri-
cally answer  meta philosophical questions about how thinkers speak, 
think, and reason about X, when doing philosophy, not philosophical 
questions about X. In the context of a diagnostic approach, these ques-
tions are not treated as empirical, but as expressions of confusion, result-
ing from defective reasoning—driven also by routine language processes 
(like the above-mentioned process of stereotypical enrichment). 
 At any rate, one strand of experimental philosophy can thus contribute to 
giving fresh content to Wittgensteinian ideas that  prima facie seem in direct 
conflict with methodological naturalism. Next, we shall consider how it 
cannot merely lend empirical substance to diagnostic approaches but pro-
vide a fresh empirical rationale for therapeutic conceptions of philosophy, 
which may appear to be even more opposed to a naturalist outlook. 
 2. Empirical Foundations for Therapeutic Philosophy 
 2.1 Philosophy as Therapy 
 More or less substantive therapeutic conceptions of philosophy can be 
obtained by identifying similarities between kinds of therapy and ways 
of doing philosophy, at the level of individual features (surface-similar-
ities) or of relations between several elements in each domain (analo-
gies). Surface similarities motivate the metaphorical extension of single 
words (e.g., ‘elephant’), namely, to attribute one or more stereotypically 
 36 Ludwig Wittgenstein,  Philosophical Investigations , trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, 3rd ed. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), §109. 
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associated features (clumsy, huge, has excellent memory), to elements of 
a new domain (‘John is an elephant’). 37 This motivates superficial talk 
of ‘retail therapy’ (like literal therapy, it—supposedly—makes someone 
feel better). By contrast, comprehensive analogies license the extension of 
several related words (“you don’t have to be  bright to  see her point; it’s 
 clear ”). These extensions are motivated by conceptual metaphors, 38 i.e., 
comprehensive mappings from one domain (e.g., vision) to another (cog-
nition), which preserve inferential relations between the terms extend-
ed. 39 Where comprehensive analogies between domains 40 license such 
extension, a new, wider category (e.g., of ‘vision’, or ‘therapy’, or ‘health’) 
may be formed. 41 
 A substantive therapeutic conception of philosophy can be obtained 
by identifying comprehensive analogies between particular areas or prac-
tices of philosophy, and either specific forms or the generic domain of 
psychotherapy. 42 On the ‘generic approach’, the metaphorical extension 
of ‘therapy’ is part-and-parcel of the wholesale extension of a family of 
related generic terms (including ‘health’, ‘illness’, ‘disease’, ‘symptom’, 
‘diagnosis’, ‘therapy’), first (and not without problems) from somatic to 
psychological phenomena, 43 then, second (and again not without prob-
lems), from these psychological phenomena to philosophy. 44 Accordingly, 
 37 See H. Bortfeld and M.S. McGlone, “The Continuum of Metaphor Processing,”  Meta-
phor and Symbol 16 (2001): 75–86 and John Searle, “Metaphor,” in  Metaphor and 
Thought , ed. A. Ortony, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
83–111. 
 38 See G. Lakoff and M. Johnson,  Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1980) and G. Lakoff and M. Johnson,  Philosophy in the Flesh (New York: Basic 
Books, 1999). 
 39 See Fischer, “Intuitions, Heuristics, Metaphors”. 
 40 See D. Gentner, “Structure Mapping: A Theoretical Framework for Analogy,”  Cognitive 
Science 7 (1983): 155–170. 
 41 See B.F. Bowdle and D. Gentner, “The Career of Metaphor,”  Psychological Review 112 
(2005): 193–216. 
 42 The ‘specific approach’ led some followers and scholars of Wittgenstein to construct 
more (e.g., M. Lazerowitz, “The Passing of an Illusion,” in  Necessity and Language , eds. 
M. Lazerowitz and A. Ambrose (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1985), 200–240) or iden-
tify less (e.g., G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker,  Wittgenstein: Meaning and Understanding: 
Essays on the Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 288; E. Harcourt, 
“Wittgenstein and Psychoanalysis,” in  The Blackwell Companion to Wittgenstein , eds. 
H.-J. Glock and J. Hyman (Oxford: Blackwell, 2017), 651–665) comprehensive analo-
gies between Wittgenstein’s approach and the specific form of psychotherapy dominant 
in his day, viz., Freudian psychoanalysis (cf. G.P. Baker, “Wittgenstein’s Method and 
Psychoanalysis,” in his,  Wittgenstein’s Method: Neglected Aspects (Oxford: Black-
well, 2004), 205–222, B.A. Farrell, “An Appraisal of Therapeutic Positivism,”  Mind 55 
(1946): 25–48 and 133–150, and J. Wisdom, “Philosophy and Psychoanalysis,” in his 
 Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (Oxford: Blackwell, 1964), 169–181. 
 43 See M. Boyle,  Schizophrenia: A Scientific Delusion , 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2000). 
 44 See E. Fischer, “Diseases of the Understanding and the Need for Philosophical Ther-
apy,”  Philosophical Investigations 34 (2011): 22–54 and P. Tarras, “ ‘Philosophie’ 
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recent proponents of therapeutic conceptions of philosophy have begun 
to spell out the underlying analogies between the domain of psychother-
apy and intended applications in philosophy 45 and to examine how their 
careless handling may mislead. 46 
 In a nutshell: 47 A common notion of  mental health is shaped by Plato’s 
ideal of a balanced, rational agent who can master his feelings and impulses 
sufficiently well to be truly autonomous ( Republic 443c—444e). People 
count as mentally  ill when they fall significantly short of this ideal and 
have  emotional problems (unwarranted and distressing or disabling emo-
tions they cannot control) or  behavioral problems (unwarranted behavior 
they cannot control), due to a  disease i.e., a literally or metaphorically 
‘inner’ process that is not under people’s direct control, which brings 
about  symptoms (emotions, thoughts, mental states) that are constitutive 
of or engender those problems. A process may qualify as  pathological , i.e., 
a ‘disease’ in virtue of these consequences, rather than any abnormality 
of or in its course. 48 A  therapy is a procedure that seeks to cure the ill-
ness, i.e., to put an end to the emotional or behavioural problems (symp-
tom relief) and prevent their recurrence (relapse prevention). It should be 
based on a  diagnosis that identifies the  disease or process causing those 
problems, in a given case. To further extend these notions to philosophy, 
we need to identify an analogous structure in that domain. This has been 
attempted for philosophical efforts addressing emotional and behavioral 
problems which arise in ordinary life (‘philosophical therapy’, e.g., Stoics) 
and in philosophical reflection (‘therapeutic philosophy’), respectively. 
 Wittgenstein can be regarded as engaged in efforts of the second kind. 
He often refers to emotional responses to philosophical questions or 
ruminations and explicitly seeks to liberate himself and others from these 
intellectual ‘disquietudes’. 49 Since he takes them to be engendered by 
wrong analogies, 50 ‘disorder in our concepts’, 51 misleading expressions, 52 
and ‘misinterpretation’, 53 he clearly regards them as unwarranted, if 
Grammatisch Betrachtet: Wittgensteins Begri der Therapie.”  Kriterion—Journal of 
Philosophy 28 (2014): 75–97. 
 45 See K. Banicki, “Philosophy as Therapy: Towards a Conceptual Model,”  Philosophical 
Papers 43 (2014): 7–31. See also Fischer,  Philosophical Delusion and Fischer, “Diseases 
of Understanding”. 
 46 Cf. B. De Mesel, “On Wittgenstein’s Comparison of Philosophical Methods to Thera-
pies,”  International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (2015): 566–583. 
 47 For more detail, see Fischer, “Diseases of Understanding,” 43–49. 
 48 D. Clouser, C. Culver, and B. Gert, “Malady,” in  What Is Disease? eds. J. Humber and 
R. Almeder (Totowa, NJ: Humana Press, 1997), 173–219. 
 49 BT 409, 415, 416, 421, 431, PI §111. See also Ludwig Wittgenstein,  Culture and Value , 
rev. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 50. 
 50 BT 409. 
 51 BT 421. 
 52 BT 416. 
 53 PI §111. 
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natural. 54 To such unwarranted emotional responses to philosophical 
questions, we can add unwarranted behavioral responses: Wherever 
such a question is ill-motivated, efforts to answer them will be equally 
unwarranted—at any rate, in the absence of an independent rationale. 
 However, to amount to emotional or behavioural problems in need 
of therapy, such unwarranted disquietudes and efforts need to be due 
to some sort of disease, i.e., to (literally or figuratively) inner processes 
that are not under the thinkers’ direct control. Many metaphilosophi-
cal remarks of Wittgenstein’s are consistent with such an aetiological 
view: Wittgenstein attributes the ‘disquietudes’ he targets to an ‘urge to 
misunderstand’, 55 i.e., a propensity that is not under subjects’ control. He 
identifies a propensity to spontaneously make unwarranted inferences, in 
line with certain invalid ‘thought-schemas’, 56 from common-sense con-
victions or observations to puzzling conclusions. 57 Through a series of 
simple ‘experiments’, 58 he elicits such inferences in his own thought and 
thus exposes certain urges he may share with others. 59 When such uncon-
trollable urges to leap to conclusions engender distressing disquietudes 
(or simply have thinkers embark on unwarranted endeavours) the latter 
can qualify as  emotional (or behavioral) problems , and the urges as  dis-
eases which he  diagnoses , for a start, in himself, 60 by eliciting the spon-
taneous conclusions that are their  symptoms . Accordingly, Wittgenstein 
maintains “the philosopher is someone who has to cure in himself many 
diseases of the understanding, before he can arrive at the notions of com-
mon sense”, 61 namely, before he can return to the common-sense notions 
from which unwarranted inferences he could not help making drove him 
to bogus puzzles. Where these problems are entirely bogus, the only genu-
ine problems facing the philosopher are the emotional and behavioral 
problems they engender. In this case, one may reasonably regard the reso-
lution of  such problems as one’s ‘entire [!] task’, as Wittgenstein strikingly 
does. 62 
 54 CV 22. 
 55 PI §109. 
 56 PI §597. 
 57 See Fischer,  Philosophical Delusion , 257–261. 
 58 PI §167. 
 59 E.g. PI §§ 166, 169, 173, 174, 176; cf. E. Fischer, “A Cognitive Self-therapy—PI 138–
97,” in  Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the “Philosophical Investigations” , eds. E. 
Ammereller and E. Fischer (London: Routledge, 2004), 86–126. 
 60 For exegetical argument that Wittgenstein often is his own main ‘patient’, see Fischer, 
“Cognitive Self-therapy” and  Philosophical Delusion , 261–264. 
 61 CV, 50. 
 62 BT 421, CV 50. In these passages, Wittgenstein asserts dispelling certain disquietudes 
is the sole purpose of his philosophizing. This is reasonable  for him : Since he is gener-
ally careful not to accept the puzzling conclusions to which his urges have him leap, he 
does not engage in any theoretical efforts to reconcile them with common sense, and 
his urges fail to engender anything describable as behavioral problems. 
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 This conception of philosophy posits the sort of analogy to psy-
chotherapy that would motivate the extension of the concept-cluster 
reviewed from the domain of psychotherapy to that of philosophy: If 
cognitive processes we cannot control drive us, in philosophical thought, 
to agonize over ill-motivated questions and make unwarranted efforts to 
answer them, i.e., if such processes make our lives miserable with gra-
tuitous worries and have us misspend them on pointless endeavors we 
would desist from if we were more fully masters of ourselves, then we 
philosophers can be said to have ‘emotional and behavioral problems’ 
that are caused by ‘diseases’ and call for ‘therapy’. 
 2.2 Empirical Foundations 
 This argument for the need for therapy in philosophy relies on an  empiri-
cal assumption : 
 (EA) There are ill-motivated philosophical questions which are for-
mulated due to cognitive (or other psychological) processes think-
ers cannot directly control. 
 These processes may be normal in their nature and course and qualify 
as ‘diseases’ in virtue of causing emotional and behavioral problems, 63 
under specific circumstances. But without (literally or metaphorically) 
‘inner’ sources  beyond thinkers’ direct control , unwarranted worries 
about ill-motivated questions, and pointless efforts to solve them, will 
not qualify as emotional and behavioral problems, respectively, and there 
will be no need for anything analogous to psychotherapy. 
 So, is that crucial assumption true? This metaphilosophical question 
brings in experimental philosophy: The strand we discussed above is all 
about empirically developing and evaluating assumptions like this. The 
Sources Project considers assumptions about the cognitive sources of 
philosophically relevant intuitions and beliefs, 64 including intuitions and 
beliefs that motivate philosophical questions and problems; it turns such 
assumptions into experimentally testable hypotheses, and experimentally 
tests them; and it focuses precisely on assumptions about the role of auto-
matic cognitive processes which we cannot directly control. 65 
 One of the major findings of cognitive and social psychology 66 over 
the last decades has been the extent to which our judgments, decisions, 
 63 Cf. Clouser, et al., “Malady”, 190. 
 64 See Knobe and Nichols, “Manifesto”, 7–8. 
 65 See Fischer, “Intuitions, Heuristics, Metaphors” and J. Nagel, “The Psychological Basis 
of the Harman-Vogel Paradox,”  Philosophers’ Imprint 11(5) (2011): 1–28. 
 66 See J.St. B.T. Evans,  Thinking Twice: Two Minds in One Brain (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2010), D. Kahneman,  Thinking Fast and Slow (London: Allen Lane, 2011), 
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and actions are shaped by cognitive processes which are  automatic : 
effortless, unconscious, initiated regardless of the subject’s goals, and not 
alterable in their course, once initiated. 67 All these properties are opera-
tionally defined (e.g., ‘effortless’ means performance requires little atten-
tion, i.e., is little affected by multitasking); they are thus measureable and 
gradable. 68 
 Intuitions , as conceived by cognitive psychologists—and experimental 
philosophy’s Sources Project—are judgments that are generated by auto-
matic inferences, i.e., by highly automatic processes that duplicate rule-
governed inferences, in particular inferences governed by heuristic rules. 69 
The speed and amount of effort required are used as a metacognitive cue to 
assess plausibility. 70 Intuitions result from highly automatic processes and 
immediately strike the thinker as plausible, regardless of whether she accepts 
those judgements upon further reflection. Some intuitions are  cognitive illu-
sions : predictable misjudgments which are automatic in origin, modifiable 
by conscious reflection, but typically strike thinkers as intuitively compel-
ling even once they have realized they cannot be right (if they realize). 71 
 Above (Section 1.2), we noted that some philosophical questions are 
motivated by perceived conflicts between intuitions, or consequences 
derived from them, and background beliefs or common-sense convic-
tions. Where such intuitions, first, qualify in the aetiological psychologi-
cal sense explained and, second, are cognitive illusions unsupported by 
further argument, we are dealing with an ill-motivated pseudo-problem 
to whose formulation cognitive processes beyond our direct control make 
an essential contribution. We highlighted an approach from the Sources 
Project that seeks to construct psychological explanations of intuitions 
that trace them back to automatic cognitive processes that are  g enerally 
 re liable but predictably lead to  c ognitive  i llusions under specific circum-
stances (Section 1.1; cf. fn.14). By explaining the intuitions at the root 
of such a philosophical problem, and helping to expose them as cog-
nitive illusions, such ‘GRECI explanations’ 72 can support the empirical 
and T.D. Wilson,  Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
 67 J.A. Bargh, “The Four Horsemen of Automaticity,” in  Handbook of Social Cognition , 
eds. R. Wyer and T. Srull, (Hillsdale: Earlbaum, 1994), 1–40. 
 68 A. Moors and J. De Houwer, “Automaticity: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis,” 
 Psychological Bulletin 132 (2006): 297–326. 
 69 D. Kahneman and S. Frederick, “A Model of Heuristic Judgment,” in  The Cambridge 
Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning , eds. K.J. Holyoak and R. Morrison (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 267–293. 
 70 V.A. Thompson, J.A. Prowse Turner, and G. Pennycook, “Intuition, Reason, and Meta-
cognition,”  Cognitive Psychology 63 (2011): 107–140. 
 71 Pohl,  Cognitive Illusions , 2–3. 
 72 As we have called them: Fischer and Engelhardt, “Intuitions’ Linguistic Sources,” 67. 
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assumption (EA) on which the present therapeutic conception of philoso-
phy relies, and show that, sometimes, philosophy needs therapy. 
 If successful, this approach can simultaneously show that nothing need 
be constitutionally wrong with the ‘patients’ targeted by therapeutic phi-
losophy: Suppose that a successful GRECI explanation identifies vitiating 
circumstances which obtain in the formulation of the given philosophical 
problem and interfere with the generally reliable automatic process. Propo-
nents of the problem are then in a similar position as mountaineers with 
altitude sickness, whose symptoms (headache, weakness, etc.) can befall even 
the physically fittest, due to the interaction of normal physiological pro-
cesses with environmental conditions (oxygen shortage at higher altitudes 
with lower atmospheric pressure): Their ‘symptoms’ (disquieting puzzlement 
in the light of paradoxical intuitions) are ultimately due to the interaction 
between a normal (and generally reliable) cognitive process and specific viti-
ating circumstances, which obtain in the formulation of the specific problem 
and may recur systematically in certain kinds of philosophical thought. 
 3. A Case in Point 
 To lend substance to these general ideas and provide evidence for the EA, 
this therapeutic conception of philosophy relies on, let’s return to our 
previous example: The ‘problem of perception’ 73 is generated by two 
paradoxes, the ‘arguments from illusion’ and ‘from hallucination’ (Sec-
tion 1.2). These rely on particular intuitions about cases of ‘illusion’ 
and hallucination 74 : For example, when a round coin, viewed sideways, 
looks elliptical, the viewer is not aware of the round coin, but of some-
thing elliptical; or: when Shakespeare’s Macbeth sees a dagger, there is 
something the hallucinating man sees. 75 Typically, proponents of those 
arguments do not provide any independent arguments to support these 
intuitive judgments. 76 Their warrant for accepting these intuitions in the 
face of tensions with background beliefs therefore depends upon the intu-
itions’ evidentiary value: on whether the mere fact that the arguments’ 
proponents have them, as and when they do, speaks for their truth. 77 
 Suppose a GRECI explanation traces these intuitions to a particular auto-
matic cognitive process and shows that, in the formulation of the paradoxes, 
 73 See Crane, “The Problem of Perception” and Smith,  The Problem of Perception . 
 74 See Robinson,  Perception , 54. 
 75 These arguments first conclude that in these particular cases, subjects are aware of 
sense-data, rather than physical objects; their second half then transfers this conclusion 
to all cases of visual perception (Crane 2015; Smith 2002). We focus here on the key 
intuitions driving the first half. 
 76 See Fischer and Engelhardt, “Intuitions’ Linguistic Sources” and Fischer,  Philosophical 
Delusion , 167–200. 
 77 See Fischer and Collins,  Rationalism and Naturalism . 
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this process operates under vitiating conditions and engenders cognitive 
illusions. Such an account will provide an undermining defeater 78 and show 
that the crucial intuitions lack evidentiary value—so that proponents of the 
argument typically lack warrant for accepting them and the further conclu-
sions that rely on them that generate the problem of perception. This will 
show the problem ill-motivated. Simultaneously, it will reveal that the prob-
lem was formulated due to automatic processes thinkers cannot directly 
control. That is, such an account will support the existence claim (EA) by 
showing that the problem of perception is a case in point. 
 Such an explanation has been developed and experimentally tested by 
Eugen Fischer and Paul Engelhardt. 79 It traces the targeted intuitions to the 
routine utterance comprehension process of stereotypical enrichment. 80 
This process automatically fills in detail: In the absence of explicit indica-
tions to the contrary, competent language users spontaneously infer that 
the situation talked about conforms to the stereotypes associated with the 
words used (e.g., that the ‘secretary’ is female). Verbs can be associated 
with typical features of actions, agents, and objects (e.g., the object ‘seen’ 
is located in front of the viewer, the person to whom something ‘seems F’ 
is inclined to think it is F, etc.). 81 These features can make up complex, 
internally structured situation-stereotypes, known as ‘generalized situ-
ation schemas’. 82 Embedded in a communicative practice that requires 
speakers to make stereotype-deviations explicit, 83 this process is generally 
reliable but leads to cognitive illusions under specific circumstances. 84 
 The proposed account of arguments from illusion and hallucination 
builds on the observation that, in formulating these arguments, philoso-
phers use appearance- and perception-verbs in a rarefied phenomenal 
sense which serves to describe subjects’ experience only 85 and is devoid 
 78 See J. Pollock, “Reliability and Justified Belief,”  Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 
(1984): 103–114. 
 79 See and E. Fischer and P.E. Engelhardt, “Diagnostic Experimental Philosophy,”  Teo-
rema 36(3) (2017): 117–137. See also Fischer and Engelhardt, “Intuitions’ Linguistic 
Sources” and “Stereotypical Inferences”, and E. Fischer, P.E. Engelhardt, and A. Her-
belot, “Intuitions and Illusions: From Explanation and Experiment to Assessment,” in 
 Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism and Naturalism , eds. E. Fischer and J. Collins 
(London: Routledge, 2015), 259–292. 
 80 See Levinson,  Presumptive Meanings . 
 81 See K. McRae, T.R. Ferretti, and I. Amyote, “Thematic Roles as Verb-specific Con-
cepts,”  Language and Cognitive Processes 12 (1997): 137–176. 
 82 D.E. Rumelhart, “Schemata: The Building Blocks of Cognition,” in  Theoretical Issues 
in Reading Comprehension , eds. R. Spiro, B. Bruce, and W. Brewer (Hillsdale, NJ: Erl-
baum, 1980), 33–58. 
 83 See Levinson,  Presumptive Meanings . 
 84 See Fischer and Engelhardt, “Intuitions’ Linguistic Sources”. 
 85 See A.J. Ayer,  The Problem of Knowledge (London: Penguin, 1956/1990) and F. 
Macpherson, “The Philosophy and Psychology of Hallucination,” in  Hallucination: 
Philosophy and Psychology , eds. F. Macpherson and D. Platchias (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2013), 1–38. 
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of stereotypical (doxastic, spatial or existential) implications these verbs 
carry in their dominant use in ordinary discourse. Arguably, this kind 
of situation recurs in philosophy, as philosophers repeatedly take words 
that have well-established uses in ordinary discourse and adapt them for 
special philosophical purposes. 
 While perfectly legitimate, such ‘tampering with words’ can have 
‘unforeseen repercussions’: 86 Dominant uses of words shape our habits 
of inference. When we encounter a polysemous word far more frequently 
in a dominant sense or use than in any of its other uses, we cannot help 
making the kind of inferences we habitually, and typically rightly, make 
when we encounter the word in that dominant sense. 87 This leads to pre-
dictable fallacies: Even competent language users may leap to conclusions 
licensed—only—by the dominant (typically literal) sense of a word, when 
encountering the word in a more rarefied (technical or metaphorical) use. 
 This happens in particular 
 (i) when a rarefied use is not explicitly marked by riders like ‘in a special 
sense’ 88 and 
 (ii) when the situation-stereotype associated with the dominant sense 
can contribute to interpreting utterances using the rarefied sense. 89 
 Conditions (i) and (ii) typically apply, respectively, to phenomenal uses of 
appearance-verbs in arguments from illusion 90 and to phenomenal uses 
of perception-verbs in arguments from hallucination. 91 
 On this account, the intuitions at the root of the latter arguments are 
generated by contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences, namely, 
spatial and existential inferences, e.g., from “Macbeth sees a dagger” to 
“There is something before Macbeth’s eyes”—if no physical object (as 
per the assumption that he is hallucinating), then a sense-datum, which 
must be before his mind’s eye. The crucial intuition about hallucination 
is thus due to the interplay of two factors: Contextually inappropriate 
 86 See Austin,  Sense and Sensibilia , 63. 
 87 See R. Giora,  On Our Mind: Salience, Context, and Figurative Language (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), G.B. Simpson and C. Burgess, “Activation and Selection 
Processes in the Recognition of Ambiguous Words,”  Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy: Human Perception and Performance 11 (1985): 28–39, and R.E. Till, E.F. Mross, 
and W. Kintsch, “Time Course of Priming for Associate and Inference Words in a Dis-
course Context,”  Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behaviour 16 (1988): 283–298. 
 88 See S. Givoni, R. Giora, and D. Bergerbest, “How Speakers Alert Addressees to Multiple 
Meanings,”  Journal of Pragmatics 48 (2013): 29–40. 
 89 See Giora,  On Our Mind and R. Giora, M. Raphaely, O. Fein, and E. Livnat, “Resonat-
ing With Contextually Inappropriate Interpretations: The Case of Irony,”  Cognitive 
Linguistics 25 (2014): 443–455. 
 90 See Fischer and Engelhardt, “Intuitions’ Linguistic Sources”. 
 91 See E. Fischer, P. Engelhardt, and A. Herbelot, “Salience Effects Drive Inappropriate 
Inferences in Philosophical Arguments: An Interdisciplinary Investigation of Philosoph-
ical Paradox,” (under review). 
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inferences are automatically made from a rarefied metaphorical use of 
‘see’ (the phenomenal use); and the conclusion is swiftly integrated with 
implicit background theories, namely, either introspective conceptions of 
the mind 92 or conceptions of ‘phenomenal space’, 93 rather than being dis-
carded in the light of a conflict with the contextual information that no 
suitable physical object is around. 
 This account gives empirical content to Wittgenstein’s idea that some 
philosophical problems are generated by “an urge to misunderstand the 
workings of our language”, 94 which has us think “as if our thinking was 
based on a thought schema” and we were “ ‘unconsciously’ translating 
from a more primitive mode of thought into ours”: 95 The present infer-
ences are based on a generalised situation schema which we know not 
to (fully) apply to the given case. In making contextually inappropriate 
stereotypical inferences that project it onto stereotype-deviant situations, 
we are leaping to conclusions as if we had the urge to treat polysemous 
words as having only one (their dominant) sense and were ‘unconsciously’ 
translating from a primitive ‘literalist’ mode of thought into ours. The 
new account explains what Wittgenstein describes. 
 Thinkers lack conscious insight into automatic inferences. 96 Nor can 
logical reconstructions of arguments establish on their own that such infer-
ences are made in clearly inappropriate contexts, as in the present example: 
Medium-strength principles of charity 97 demand that we justify attribu-
tions of clearly inappropriate inferences by providing empirically supported 
explanations of why competent thinkers make them (cf. Section 1.2). 
Accordingly, Fischer and Engelhardt 98 justified crediting competent speak-
ers with inappropriate spatial and existential inferences from phenomenal 
uses of ‘see’, by invoking psycholinguistic theories that would account for 
them (see above) 99 and experimentally testing for the posited inferences. 
 92 See Fischer, “Intuitions, Heuristics, Metaphors” and E. Fischer, “Mind the Metaphor! A 
Systematic Fallacy in Analogical Reasoning,”  Analysis 75 (2015): 67–77. 
 93 See M. Hymers,  Wittgenstein on Sensation and Perception (New York: Routledge, 
2017), 6–13. 
 94 See PI §109. 
 95 See PI §597. 
 96 See Bargh, “Four Horseman” and Moors and De Houwer, “Automaticity”. 
 97 See Thagard and Nisbett, “Rationality and Charity”. 
 98 See Fischer and Engelhardt, “Stereotypical Inferences”, “Diagnostic Experimental Phi-
losophy”, and Fischer et al., “Salience Effects”. 
 99 The account outlined relies on the graded salience hypothesis (See Fein et al., “On the 
Priority of Salience-Based Interpretations: The Case of Sarcastic Irony”  Intercultural 
Pragmatics 12 (2015): 1–32, Giora,  On Our Mind , and Giora et al., “Resonating”), the 
cued-schemas account of language comprehension/production and Levinson’s I-heuris-
tic. See J.L. Elman, “On the Meaning of Words and Dinosaur Bones: Lexical Knowledge 
Without a Lexicon,”  Cognition 33 (2009): 547–582, Levinson,  Presumptive Meanings , 
and Fischer et al., “Intuitive Inferences”. 
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 If subjects really make these inferences (e.g., from ‘S sees X’ to  X is in 
front of S ), they will be surprised when the verb is followed by a sequel 
inconsistent with the inferred conclusion, as in (1), but not (2): 
 (1) Jeb sees the spot on the wall behind him. 
 (2) Matt sees the spot on the wall facing him. 
 When we are surprised, our eyes’ pupils expand; pupil dilation is an 
index of surprisal. 100 Accordingly, one can examine whether automatic 
inferences are made by measuring pupil size during and after partici-
pants hear sentences like (1) and (2): When significant dilations occur 
after sentences like (1) but not (2), this is evidence that the hypothesized 
(spatial-directional) inferences are automatically made from ‘see’, in lan-
guage comprehension. 
 To examine the hypothesis that participants make spatial inferences 
(from ‘S sees X’ to  X is in front of S ) not only where ‘see’ is used in its 
dominant perceptual sense (as in 1 and 2) but also—inappropriately—
where it is used in much less frequent (e.g., epistemic or phenomenal) 
senses, 101 experimentalists can use sentences like: 
 (3) Jack sees the problems he left behind. 
 (4) Joe sees the problems that lie ahead. 
 Here, a purely epistemic reading of ‘see’ ( Macmillan Advanced Learners’ 
Dictionary [MEDAL] , sense 4) and a purely metaphorical reading of the 
spatial sequel (‘left behind’ = in the past, ‘lie ahead’ = in the future) are 
readily available. On this interpretation, both (4) and (3) are perfectly 
consistent, and (3) is utterly unsurprising—of course people can know 
what problems they had in the past. But if the hypothesized inappropri-
ate inferences occur, pupils will dilate when participants hear the likes of 
(3)—but not of (4). 
 To follow up the hypothesis that relevant inferences are supported by 
features (stereotypical associations) of the verb, we add otherwise identi-
cal sentences that replace ‘see’ by an otherwise similar verb without spa-
tial associations. E.g., ‘is aware of’ is ordinarily used in an epistemic sense, 
to attribute knowledge that may, but need not, be acquired through the 
 100 See D. Kahneman,  Attention and Effort (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973) 
and B. Laeng, S. Sirois, and G. Gredeback, “Pupillometry: A Window to the Precon-
scious?”  Perspectives on Psychological Science 7 (2012): 18–27. 
 101 A corpus analysis supports the hypothesis about relative frequencies. See Fischer et al., 
“Intuitive Inferences”. 
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five senses ( MEDAL ,  WordNet ), and should have the same existential/
factive implications as ‘see’ 102 but lack spatial associations: 103 
 (3*) Jack is aware of the problems he left behind. 
 (4*) Joe is aware of the problems that lie ahead. 
 The present hypothesis predicts pupils will dilate after the likes of (3) but 
not of (3*). 
 Conclusions of automatic inferences can be suppressed, 104 before they 
can influence people’s judgments or further reasoning. To determine 
whether the posited inferences were automatically made and went on to 
influence judgments, Fischer and Engelhardt 105 combined pupil measure-
ments with a plausibility rating task: If conclusions are not suppressed, 
their clash with the sequel will make participants judge sentences like 
(1) and (3) significantly less plausible than sentences like (2) and (4), respec-
tively, even more than a second after sentence offset—and even though it 
is at least as plausible that people should know what problems they had 
in the past (as per 3) than what awaits them in the hard-to-predict future 
(as per 4). Similarly, ‘see’-sentences like (3) will strike participants as less 
plausible than analogous ‘aware’-sentences (like 3*)—even though they 
mean the same, on the readily available epistemic reading of ‘see’. 
 In both studies, pupil measurements suggested that participants indeed 
made spatial inferences both—appropriately—from perceptual uses of 
‘see’ (as in 1 and 2), and—inappropriately—from less common non-
perceptual uses (as in 3 and 4), though not from analogous uses of ‘aware’ 
(as in 3* and 4*). Plausibility ratings suggested that conclusions of both 
appropriate and inappropriate inferences influenced subsequent judg-
ments: ‘See’-sentences like (3) were judged less, not more plausible than 
sentences like (4), and less plausible than semantically apparently identical 
‘aware’-sentences, like (3*), which were deemed exactly as plausible as the 
likes of (4*): The manipulation of the spatial sequel affected the plausibil-
ity of ‘see’-, but not ‘aware’-sentences. 
 In these ways, experiments can examine hypotheses about what auto-
matic inferences are made, appropriately or otherwise, from linguis-
tic case descriptions and premises of arguments. The studies outlined 
 102 Fischer et al., “Intuitive Inferences”, submit that versions of the argument from hallu-
cination which use ‘aware’ involve inappropriate existential inferences from this verb’s 
phenomenal use. 
 103 This hypothesis is supported by a production experiment (See Fischer and Engelhardt, 
“Diagnostic Experimental Philosophy”). 
 104 See M. Faust and M.A. Gernsbacher, “Cerebral Mechanisms for Suppression of Inap-
propriate Information During Sentence Comprehension,”  Brain and Language 53 
(1996): 234–259. 
 105 See Fischer and Engelhardt, “Stereotypical Inferences” and Fischer et al., “Intuitive 
Inferences”. 
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support a debunking explanation of intuitions at the root of arguments 
from hallucination. This explanation traces them back to contextually 
inappropriate stereotypical inferences from rare uses of perception-verbs, 
and thus exposes them as cognitive illusions. 
 Together with analogous work on the intuitions grounding arguments 
from illusion, 106 these studies contribute to showing that the problem of 
perception generated by these two related paradoxes is, first, ill-motivated 
and, second, formulated due to an automatic cognitive process thinkers 
cannot directly control, namely, stereotypical enrichment. This provides 
initial support for the empirical existence assumption (EA) on which 
the outlined therapeutic conception of philosophy relies: There are ill-
motivated philosophical questions which are formulated due to cognitive 
(or other psychological) processes thinkers cannot directly control. This 
example also lets us understand how competent thinkers can come to 
raise such questions: The relevant cognitive process is generally reliable; 
but in the formulation of the paradoxical arguments that motivate the 
question, it operates under vitiating conditions—(i) and (ii) above. To 
what extent further philosophical problems fit this bill can be explored 
by combining analytic case-studies on philosophical texts (to identify 
relevant intuitions and their role in problem-genesis) with experimental 
work (testing explanations of those intuitions), in future research. 
 4. Cognitive Philosophical Therapy 
 In this chapter, we have seen how a key strand of experimental philosophy 
(the ‘Sources Project’) (Section 1.1), can facilitate diagnostic approaches to 
characteristically philosophical problems (Section 1.2) and provide a ther-
apeutic conception of philosophy in Wittgenstein’s wake (Section 2.1) with 
empirical foundations (Section 2.2). A case-study provided a first ‘pudding 
proof’ (Section 3). In closing, we now consider how the empirical findings 
reviewed can contribute not merely to establishing the need for therapeutic 
philosophy (Section 2) but also provide means for putting it into practice. 
 The aim of the diagnostic approach is to ‘dissolve’ particular philosophi-
cal problems by showing them ill-motivated. 107 The further aims of therapy 
are (a) to enable proponents of the ‘problem’ to rationally  and effectively 
give up pursuing and worrying about it, and (b) to prevent them from fall-
ing for similar pseudo-problems in the future (Section 2.1). 108 A diagnostic 
analysis that succeeds in identifying fallacies in the motivating reasoning 
may fail to secure repudiation of the resulting problem, where automatic 
cognitive processes drive effortless inferences to intuitions that continue to 
 106 See Fischer et al., “Intuitive Inferences” and Fischer and Engelhardt, “Intuitions’ Lin-
guistic Sources”. 
 107 cf. BT 421. 
 108 Cf. BT 421 and CV 50. 
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strike thinkers as plausible 109 —and their clash with background beliefs as 
worrying. In addition, such diagnostic analysis of one problem will not  per 
se prevent a thinker from falling for other ill-motivated problems driven 
by the same cognitive processes. To achieve the goals of therapy, more 
than reconstruction of motivating reasoning and identification of fallacies 
appears to be required. But what more? 
 Cognitive behavioral therapy 110 works with a variety of therapeutic 
methods which can serve as useful models. 111 This frequently used ‘talk-
ing cure’ seeks to lastingly increase patients’ rational autonomy to an 
extent sufficient to end their emotional and behavioral problems and to 
prevent relapse. The key idea is that rational autonomy can be enhanced 
through metacognitive insight: by coming to understand how automatic 
processes of which we are not aware shape our thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors, including the behaviors and emotions constitutive of symp-
toms. This new self-understanding allows patients to grow aware of, 
and critically examine, dysfunctional judgments and beliefs they had 
previously just presupposed; it facilitates a new, more detached attitude 
towards them, which mitigates what distress and behavioral responses 
they otherwise occasion. 
 Accordingly, cognitive therapy systematically builds on findings from 
cognitive and social psychology, and cognitive neuroscience, to develop 
empirically supported models of how symptoms arise in different con-
ditions (depression, anxiety, psychosis, etc.). 112 A key part of an indi-
vidual therapy then consists in developing an understanding of how the 
model applies to the individual patient, and helping her to acquire this 
understanding. 113 This often involves identifying and mitigating psycho-
logical motivations like the need to defend against low self-esteem, which 
may help maintain problematic beliefs and inference-styles, and need 
to be mitigated, e.g., through behavioral confidence-building exercises, 
before the patient is willing and able to acquire a new self-understanding. 
However, most behavioral accretions that turn cognitive into cognitive 
 109 Cf. PI§§ 109, 597. This situation is liable to recur, since automatic processes are not 
under our direct control, but highly fluent (i.e. effortless), and fluency acts as a meta-
cognitive cue for assessing plausibility (See Thompson et al., “Metacognition”.). Also, 
subsequent reflection may seek to justify rather than correct plausible (but wrong) 
intuitions (See Evans,  Thinking Twice ). 
 110 See J.S. Beck,  Cognitive Therapy: Basics and Beyond . 2nd ed. (New York: Guilford, 
2011). 
 111 cp. PI §133. 
 112 See R.P. Bentall,  Madness Explained (London: Penguin, 2003) and A.T. Beck, N.A. 
Rector, N. Stolar, and P. Grant,  Schizophrenia: Cognitive Theory, Research, and Ther-
apy (New York: Guildford, 2008). 
 113 See Beck et al.,  Schizophrenia and H.E. Nelson,  Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy With 
Delusions and Hallucinations , 2nd ed. (Cheltenham: Nelson Thornes, 2005). 
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behavioral therapy are ultimately geared towards the achievement of 
metacognitive insight. 
 For some health conditions, the therapeutic aims can be attained through 
insight into the underlying automatic processes, without changing their 
course or outputs. For example, cognitive therapists accept that they can-
not put an end to auditory hallucinations (voices) in psychosis and rather 
seek to change patients’ attitude towards their voices, so that they are 
no longer distressed by them or inclined to obey their commands. Key 
to this change of attitude is coming to understand how voices arise from 
inner speech, through failure of source monitoring, in response, e.g., to 
trauma, and that voices articulate own thoughts, not others’ opinions or 
commands. 114 
 I suggest that analogous metacognitive insight into how automatic 
processes shape intuitions and philosophical thought are what more is 
apparently required for therapeutic philosophy, in addition to the expo-
sure of mistakes through the diagnostic approach. 115 The philosophical 
problem we considered was generated by unsound paradoxes driven by 
intuitions that are cognitive illusions. The analogy to cognitive therapy 
suggests that thinkers will come to effectively give up pursuing such a 
problem the moment they are not only aware of the fallacies involved 
in its motivating reasoning, but understand the automatic cognitive pro-
cesses that generate the intuitions at its root, and how and why these 
processes had them commit those fallacies and find the intuitive conclu-
sions plausible. Again, therapy need not change the course and outputs 
of relevant automatic processes which include fundamental comprehen-
sion processes. Rather, it needs to change thinkers’ attitude towards the 
intuitions these processes deliver: replacing acceptance by detachment, 
as default, and by rejection, wherever vitiating circumstances obtain. Key 
to this is the acquisition of relevant metacognitive insight: of a shared 
understanding of what automatic processes drive our intuitive inferences 
and judgments and of precisely when and why they go awry. 
 Such understanding has benefits beyond the individual problem con-
sidered: It helps prevent falling for similar problems and devises measures 
to guard against them. For example, insight into the conditions under 
which stereotypical enrichment leads to contextually inappropriate infer-
ences helps us identify such inferences in lines of thought that set up other 
problems and to formulate case-descriptions in ways that do not invite 
such inferences (e.g., explicitly marking rarefied uses and refraining from 
 114 See Bentall,  Madness Explained , 347–377 and Nelson,  Cognitive Behavioural Ther-
apy , 228–247. 
 115 In fact, such metacognitive insight is required already to defend diagnostic accounts in 
the light of plausible principles of charity (e.g., Thagard and Nisbett 1983) (see Section 
1.2). 
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giving special uses to words that already have clearly dominant uses in 
ordinary discourse). 
 The relevant metacognitive insight or enhanced self-understanding begins 
to be provided by experimental philosophy’s Sources Project. Just as clini-
cal psychologists have systematically built on findings from cognitive and 
social psychology and cognitive neuroscience to develop empirically sup-
ported models of how symptoms arise in different mental health conditions, 
so experimental philosophers are systematically building on findings from 
those very disciplines, to develop empirically supported models of how 
philosophically relevant intuitions arise—and, more generally, of how auto-
matic cognition shapes philosophically relevant thought. Just as the former 
models provide the key input for cognitive behavioral therapy, so the lat-
ter models provide the key input for a therapeutic philosophy. In summary, 
the findings from experimental philosophy’s Sources Project contribute to 
providing a fresh empirical rationale for therapeutic conceptions of philoso-
phy in the wake of Wittgenstein and can give us precisely the kind of meta-
cognitive insight that is necessary to put such conceptions into practice. 116 
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